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NOTES
HAS SHAFFER V. HEITNER BEEN LOST AT SEA?
In 1977, the Supreme Court reshaped the landscape of personal
jurisdiction with its holding in Shaffer v. Heitner,l which subjected
exercises of jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem to the same standard
of constitutional scrutiny that has been applied to actions in personam since International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2 Under the International
Shoe standard, a court could not assert jurisdiction over a defendant
unless that defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum, such
that the exercise of jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. In extending this analysis to seizurebased jurisdiction, Shaffer requires a relationship between the forum
state, the defendant, and the cause of action.'
In Shaffer, the plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative action in
Delaware against a former officer of the corporation (a non-resident of
Delaware) and had shares of stock owned by the defendant attached,
giving the Delaware court quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant.
In his analysis for the majority in Shaffer, Justice Marshall distinguished
two types of quasi in rem actions, as well as the true in rem action. 4
In both the true in rem action and in one type of quasi in rem action,
the plaintiff's claim is directly related to the property which is the
subject of the seizure. 5 Justice Marshall specifically noted that where
there was such a relationship between the property (and therefore its
owner) and the cause of action, it would be difficult to imagine when
an assertion of jurisdiction would be constitutionally impermissible. 6 But
in the second type of quasi in rem action, where the property is unrelated
to the cause of action, its attachment may only serve as the basis for
jurisdiction to the extent that jurisdiction is supported by other contacts
of the defendant with the forum so that the standards of International
Shoe are met. 7
Provisions for seizures in rem and quasi in rem are found in the
Supplemental Rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for Admiralty. Rule B provides for the attachment of a defendant's "goods
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA
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and chattels, or credits and effects ... if the defendant shall not be
found within the district."' The rule is functionally identical to the
Delaware sequestration statute which permits a court to "compel the
appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his
property, which property may be sold under the order of the Court to
pay the demand of the plaintiff if the defendant does not appear or
otherwise defaults." 9 Both rules create actions quasi in rem, because
there is no requirement that there be any connection between the property
and the cause of action. Rule C, by contrast, deals only with actions
for the enforcement of maritime liens.' 0 Such liens are, by definition,
directly linked to the property seized under Rule C:
Upon the occurrence of certain mishaps or the non-fulfillment
of certain obligations arising out of contract or status, the
maritime law gives to the party aggrieved a right conceived of
as a property interest in the tangible thing involved (usually but
not always a ship) in the (often as yet unascertained) amount
of the accrued liability."
Accordingly, as the title to the rule recognizes, actions under Rule C are
true in rem proceedings.
Despite the obvious parallels between these actions in admiralty and
similar proceedings in other areas of state law, 2 the cases in which the
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty have been challenged show a reluctance to apply a Shaffer-type analysis to assertions of jurisdiction quasi
in rem. More disturbingly, with one notable exception, this issue has
often been ignored altogether. Thus, while few cases have arisen in
which jurisdiction would be questionable under Shaffer, the tendency
of the courts to avoid addressing this issue may lead attorneys to consider
an objection to jurisdiction futile in the future, 3 even if a defendant
is sued in a manifestly unfair forum. This comment will review the
8.

The pertinent section of Rule B states:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods
and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the
complaint to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within
the district. Such a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by
the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge, or to the best of
his information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within the district.
When a verified complaint is supported by such an affidavit the clerk shall
forthwith issue a summons and process of attachment and garnishment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule B.
9. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 366 (1975), quoted in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190, n. 4,
97 S. Ct. at 2572, n. 4.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C.
11. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §§ 1-12, at 35 (2d ed. 1975).
12. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. art. 9.
13. This may have been the case in Polar Shipping v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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decisions which have overlooked and therefore undermined the applicability
of Shaffer to admiralty proceedings, analyze the reasoning of these
decisions, and suggest a fair and practical alternative to the current
attitude concerning Shaffer's applicability in this field.
Minimum Contacts in Federal Court
After the Court's pronouncement in Shaffer, the validity of admiralty
proceedings in rem and quasi in rem was immediately called into question
by legal commentators. 4 The first issue to be addressed is the applicability of Shaffer, which dealt with the exercise of jurisdiction by state
courts, to federal exercises of jurisdiction. Because Shaffer was decided
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
addresses only state action, it technically does not bind the federal courts.
By contrast, limitations of the national sovereign's jurisdictional authority
arise, not from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."5
It has become generally accepted that when a suit is in federal court
on a federal cause of action with jurisdiction acquired solely under
federal authority, the forum to be considered is the United States as
one entity; thus a due process analysis should focus on the defendant's
contacts with the United States as a whole.' 6 Presumably, a defendant
would then be afforded the protections of venue provisions to avoid
litigating in an inconvenient forum. 7 This theory was used to support
admiralty jurisdiction under Shaffer soon after it was decided, as well
as by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in the most recent decision
regarding Rule B.' s Assuming that the above analysis was to be applied,
the policy of fairness that controls state exercises of jurisdiction would
arguably apply to federal courts as well. The only significant difference
in the analysis, other than the forum to be considered, would be the
absence of "principles of interstate federalism,"' 9 which would lessen

14. See generally, Batiza & Partridge, The Constitutional Challenge to Maritime
Seizures, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 203 (1980); Comment, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and
Attachment, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1091 (1978); Bohmann, Applicability of Shaffer To Admiralty
In Rem Jurisdiction, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 135 (1978).
15. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981); Fitzsimmons v.
Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d
Cir. 1974).
16. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981); Fitzsimmons v.
Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979).
17. Comment, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and Attachment, 56 Tex. L. Rev.
1091, 1117, n. 165 (1978).
18. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 459
F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Trans-Asiatic Oil, Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956
(1st Cir. 1984).
19. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 293, 100 S. Ct. 559,
565 (1980).
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the requisite connexity with the forum to sustain jurisdiction; that is,
while the Supreme Court has held that state courts must consider the
interests of other states before claiming jurisdiction over a defendant, 0
a federal court need not exercise such deference.
Yet even under this relaxed standard, jurisdiction under Shaffer has
not always been upheld in federal courts. 2 Moreover, if one views the
United States as a whole to be the forum in these circumstances, the
validity of attachment under Rule B might be lost, since such "nonresident" attachment is traditionally acceptable only in the context of
an absent defendant. In that regard, the rule reflects the law as it existed
in the early days of the Republic, when jurisdiction was based on the
presence of the defendant in the forum, and jurisdiction quasi in rem
was a necessary device for adjudicating disputes concerning absentee
defendants who could avoid service of process simply by escaping to
another state. Since the advent of modern jurisdictional theories and
state long-arm statutes, quasi in rem attachments are considered by some
writers to be historical anomalies which today serve more as security
devices than as instruments of jurisdiction. 22 This argument (that Rule
B is a vestige of a bygone jurisdictional era) is supported by the language
of the rule itself, which is available only if the defendant is "not to
be found within the district,"21 3 and therefore seems to contemplate
difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction by other means, a problem which is
less common today than it was in earlier times.
In Shaffer, the Supreme Court refused to eliminate quasi in rem
jurisdiction altogether, but subjected it to scrutiny under International
Shoe. It would appear certain that, inasmuch as procedures in rem and
quasi in rem in admiralty are identical to those under the statutory and
common law addressed in Shaffer, those seizures should be subject to
scrutiny under a Shaffer analysis. As represented below, however, the
jurisprudence has largely chosen to distinguish admiralty for purposes
of applying constitutional limitations on judicial authority which are
designed to assure basic fairness in the legal system. The arguments for
making Shaffer applicable to admiralty have been weakened by cases
which have refused to apply procedural safeguards against seizures in
admiralty. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.24 and Fuentes v. Shevin"5
the Supreme Court held that before a plaintiff could seize a defendant's
property (in these cases, wages and household goods, respectively) pur-

20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Leema Enter. Inc. v. Willi, 575 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
22. Note, Maritime Attachment Under Rule B: A Jurisdictional Disguise for an
Unconstitutional Security Attachment, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 403, 404 (1977); Batiza &
Partridge, The Constitutional Challenge to Maritime Seizures, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 203, 23536 (1980).
23. See supra note 8.
24. 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969).
25. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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suant to filing a lawsuit, due process requires that the defendant be
notified of the seizure and that a hearing be held to justify it. As will
be explained below, the courts of appeal have uniformly refused to
extend these procedures to seizures in admiralty, and in doing so, have
called into question the applicability of Shaffer in the maritime realm.
The first significant case to squarely face the issue of the constitutional amenability of maritime seizures was Grand Bahama Petroleum
Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd.2 6 The facts of Grand Bahama
would have made the assertion of jurisdiction by the court under a
Shaffer analysis in a non-maritime matter questionable, to say the least.
The plaintiff was a Bahamian firm which had supplied fuel in the
Bahamas to a vessel under charter to the defendants. The cause of
action, arising in the Bahamas, was completely unrelated to the forum,
Seattle, Washington. The defendant's only contact with Washington was
the presence of a bank account in Seattle, which was attached pursuant
to Rule B. As the trial court admitted, this relationship with the forum,
while arguably more substantial than that of the defendants in Shaffer
to the trial forum in that case, was "a limited contact nonetheless." 27
Having conceded the tenuousness of this relationship, the court
refused to proceed with a Shaffer-type analysis, finding the analogy with
Shaffer to be only superficial, and application of a minimum contacts
test therefore unnecessary. The court struck a chord which set the tone
for the courts of appeal in cases to come: "[Shaffer ]can be distinguished
on both constitutional and analytical grounds." 28 The sources of the
distinctions, according to Grand Bahama, lay in the Constitution's separate grant of power to the federal courts to hear cases in admiralty,
and the historical acceptance and use of maritime attachment in the
American law of admiralty.2 9
It is ironic that one of the greatest steps in establishing an exception
to Shaffer's due process requirements for admiralty came not in a
challenge to Rule B, nor even in a challenge under Shaffer, but rather
in a challenge to Rule C on procedural due process grounds. In Merchants National Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L. Gillespie,3" the Fifth Circuit
relied on the unique character and context of the maritime lien in holding
that maritime seizures under Rule C need not strictly meet the procedural
due process requirements set forth in Sniadach, Fuentes, and their progeny. 3' The court narrowly limited its inquiry early in the opinion and
re-emphasized this narrowness in its conclusion: "We emphasize again
that the present opinion addresses only admiralty proceedings in rem,

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
Id.at 452.
Id.at 453.
Id.at 453-55.
663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id.at 1345.
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and in no way concerns the in personam or quasi in rem proceedings
that also arise in admiralty, particularly the garnishment procedures of
Rule B." 32 Thus, while the problems of constitutional amenability under
Shaffer did not surface in Merchant's Nat'l Bank, the court was specifically staying its hand. Additionally, the panel's reservation implicitly
recognized Justice Marshall's point that pure in rem proceedings would
probably be unaffected by an application of Shaffer. By specifically
refusing to rule on Rule B, the court realized that it was only in a
quasi in rem situation, such as in Grand Bahama, that amenability under
Shaffer would present a difficult issue. The court wisely chose to avoid
an unnecessary decision on that point.
Judge Tate, in dissent, invoked Shaffer as authority for refusing to
create an exception in admiralty to the procedural due process requirements of the Constitution. 3 Conceding that Shaffer dealt specifically
with substantive due process, he read the Court's opinion as providing
for a uniform standard of due process for all private litigants. Both in
procedural and substantive due process analyses in admiralty, his has
remained the minority position.
The trend to distinguish admiralty in matters arising under the Due
Process Clause was first extended to Rule B the following year in Polar
Shipping Ltd. v. OrientalShipping Corp.3" In PolarShipping the plaintiff
had chartered a vessel to the defendant. Claiming that the charter had
expired, the plaintiff attached certain credits due to the defendant in
Hawaii. While the court's opinion does not discuss the contacts of the
defendant with Hawaii, the defense's apparent failure to raise the issue
of constitutional amenability suggests that the defendant probably did
have sufficient contacts with the forum to sustain jurisdiction, or that,
on the basis of Grand Bahama and similar decisions, the defendant
believed that to raise such a challenge would be useless. Nonetheless,
it is surprising that the panel majority did not even raise Shaffer in
light of its recognition that "under Supplemental Rule B, in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained by compelling its appearance
through attachment of its goods and chattels or, credits and effects." 5
This finding, of course, echoes Justice Marshall's characterization of
the Delaware statute at issue in Shaffer and invites comparison. This
fact was apparent to the dissenting judge who noted that "the need to
obtain jurisdiction (by attaching the defendant's assets) may not even
be a factor that this court should consider. Shaffer v. Heitner held that
quasi in rem jurisdiction violates due process because it does not meet
the minimum contacts standards of jurisdiction. 36 This statement in

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
680
Id.
Id.

at 1350.
at 1353 (Tate, J., dissenting).
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
at 630.
at 645 (Byrne, J., dissenting).
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dissent may, however, be too broad. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is unconstitutional only if a defendant in a particular action does not have
minimum contacts with the forum, within the meaning of International
Shoe.
One would surmise that the dissenting judge discussed this point
with the other members of the panel, but any such consideration is
conspicuously absent from the majority opinion. Like the Fifth Circuit
in Merchants Nat'l Bank, the court was apparently reluctant to address
the issue when it was not properly before it. The panel chose instead
to follow its predecessors in distinguishing admiralty for purposes of
due process review, relying largely on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Merchants Nat'l Bank. While noting that in Merchants Nat'l Bank
"Judge Brown expressly limited his decision to Supplemental Rule C
and refrained from intimating any opinion concerning a writ of foreign
attachment to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in an
in personam suit, such as we have before us," 3 7 the court stated that
"[n]evertheless, we think that the principle announced by Judge Brown
is also applicable to Supplemental Rule B." 38 The basis of this distinction,
as in other cases, rested on the separate grant of authority to hear cases
in admiralty in the Constitution, the historical background of the rule,
and the court's belief that practical considerations make the device of
seizure essential in admiralty proceedings.
The Eleventh Circuit repeated this reasoning last year in rejecting
a similar challenge to Rule B.39 The background of the case suggests
that the courts may have begun to assume the constitutionality of seizures
in admiralty regardless of the relationship of the property involved to
the forum or the cause of action. The parties had negotiated and signed
a charter in New York, under which the defendant received use of the
plaintiff's vessel. During the term of the charter the defendant damaged
certain goods en route to Argentina and refused to pay damages. To
avoid its own liability, the plaintiff brought an action in Savannah,
Georgia, contending that the plaintiff was "entitled to indemnity and/
or contribution from defendant with respect to any liability which may
be adjudged against it in favor of the cargo interests." ' 40 The suit alleged
that the vessel, Puntas Malvinas, property of the defendant (but not
the vessel involved in the charter sued upon), was in port and prayed
that it be arrested and attached. The clerk of court had the vessel
arrested. When it was subsequently discovered that the vessel itself was
not the property of the defendant, the plaintiff amended his pleadings

37. Id. at 637.
38. Id.
39. Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir.
1984).
40. Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. Bottacchi, 552 F. Supp. 771, 773
(S.D. Ga. 1982).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

to request attachment of cargo on the vessel owned by the defendant,
4
which resulted in the seizure of that property. '
The jurisdictional problems raised on these facts are readily apparent.
In terms of a Shaffer analysis, there was no apparent connection between
the cause of action and the forum, because the contract at issue was
made in New York, and the property seized was unrelated to the contract.
Furthermore, there appeared to be no connection between the defendant
and the forum other than the fortuitous presence of the defendant's
property there. Consequently, under Shaffer, there would be insufficient
contacts to support jurisdiction. Moreover, Grand Bahama can be distinguished because in this case there was an alternate forum availablesurely suit could have been brought in New York, where the contract
was made.
Despite these obvious problems, the court of appeals did not address
the issue of constitutional amenability under Shaffer. The district court
discussed Shaffer in an exposition of the recent history of both substantive and procedural due process in admiralty, but ultimately stated
that "it is settled that Shaffer is not applicable to admiralty jurisdiction." 2 The court of appeals was silent on this point, although like its
predecessors, it was eager to distinguish admiralty for constitutional
purposes, citing a familiar litany of ancient cases and historical authority.
As the foregoing synopsis of the pertinent jurisprudence should make
clear, the district court could claim no authority for its statement that
the inapplicability of Shaffer to admiralty is settled, except from the
Grand Bahama decision. At that time, none of the courts of appeal
had directly faced the issue, although the Second Circuit had discussed
4
it.
1 Clearly, the Fifth Circuit did not intend to decide the issue
when
its panel expressly limited its decision in Merchants Nat'l Bank, and
the Ninth Circuit, in Polar Shipping, was apparently aware of the issue
when it refrained from discussing it in its analysis of Rule B. What the
court probably relied on was the apparent attitude of the courts, expressed in procedural due process challenges to the Admiralty Rules,
that "Admiralty is Old and Admiralty is Different."" While this attitude
is discernible, it is not authoritative. Accordingly, rumors of the death
of Shaffer in admiralty proceedings may be premature.
The latest case to address the constitutionality of the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty is the first to address the applicability of Shaffer
in admiralty proceedings since Grand Bahama.4 5 In Trans-Asiatic Oil,

41. 732 F.2d at 1544-45.
42. 552 F. Supp. at 775-76, 782.
43. See case cited supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
44. Merchants Nat'l. Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1353 (Tate,
J., dissenting).
45. The Second Circuit discussed Shaffer but did not specifically address its applicability to admiralty proceedings. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co.,4 6 the First Circuit Court of Appeals seems to'
have indicated that, in the proper factual context, Shaffer may still be
a viable limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts sitting
in admiralty. In Trans-Asiatic Oil, a Panamanian corporation filed suit
in Puerto Rico against a Missouri-based corporation and attached certain
credits there due the defendant. The defendant challenged the seizure
on both substantive and procedural due process grounds.
Although the court did not "decide to what degree a foreign admiralty defendant must have minimum contacts with the United States
to be subject to quasi in rem jurisdiction, ' 47 the court applied a minimum
contacts analysis to address the jurisdictional amenability.of the defendant, a domestic corporation. In dismissing the defendant's argument
that it was protected by Shaffer, the court stated that "[fqederal jurisdiction being national in scope, due process only requires- sufficient
contacts within the United States as a whole,"'4 obviating, the need to
discuss the issue of the jurisdictional amenability of foreign defendants.
Although this ended the minimum contacts discussion, the court apparently assumed that, as an American corporation, -the defendant could
not argue a lack of contacts with the United States to challenge the
court's jurisdiction. After disposing of the minimum contacts issue, the
court held that, where a minimum contacts test is met, a defendant is
not protected by the constitutional requirements of International Shoe,.
but by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 9 As discussed below,.
forum non conveniens is basically a venue protection which evolved in
the common law and which is now partially codified.5 °
While the court is entirely correct in its analysis, it should be pointed
out that the InternationalShoe/Shaffer due process protections afforded.
a defendant against suit in an unfair forum are not to be, confused
with those offered by forum non conveniens, although that. doctrine has
been used to dismiss defendants in admiralty, leaving, complainants to
seek redress in a foreign forum. 5' Thus, a court should. not fall into
the analytical trap of refusing to offer constitutional protections in
admiralty on the grounds that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
offers sufficient or identical safeguards.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal or transfer
is determined under a standard of convenience, as opposed to the fairness
test imposed by Shaffer and International Shoe. This is a logical distinction, since a decision on the venue issue presumes the constitutionality
of jurisdiction (although some courts have held that a venue question

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

743 F.2d 956 (lst Cir. 1984).
Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
See, e.g., Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981).
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may be addressed without an inquiry into the existence of jurisdiction).52
Importantly, in a motion to transfer or dismiss on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, the movant bears a heavy burden of proving that the
complainant's choice of forum is inconvenient, reflecting great deference
to that choice. This burden is detailed in Justice Jackson's classic statement of factors to be weighed in a court's decision on a forum non
conveniens issue:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most
pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious,
and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said
that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
"vex,'' "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon
him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue
his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 3
Obviously, the forum which is most "easy, expeditious, and inexpensive"
will not always be the one that is most fair in jurisdictional terms. Otherwise a foreign defendant might be forced to defend a suit in the United
States because the plaintiff, his attorneys, his physicians, his expert
witnesses, and his documentary evidence are all located there, even though
the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the United States, even taken
as a whole. Given such a scenario, fairness should dictate the availability
of constitutional protections afforded by Shaffer.
In Trans-Asiatic Oil, the court preserved the possible availability of such
protection to foreign defendants. With the door thus open to extend
Shaffer to admiralty, courts should carefully observe the rationale of
Trans-Asiatic Oil, rather than succumb to the temptation to look instead
only at the court's decision, which sustained jurisdiction.

52. Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1145, nn. 6-7 (5th
Cir. 1984)(discussing the division of the circuits on this point and the Supreme Court

authority relied on in the Fifth Circuit).
53.

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,

508, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843 (1947). Gilbert

has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981), and has been adopted in the Fifth Circuit. See Perusahaan
Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/V Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "[I]n an opinion which has been recognized as having 'crystallized' the law of forum
non conveniens, the Gilbert court all but codified the relative law." 711 F.2d at 1234).
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Surprisingly, the court in Trans-Asiatic Oil made no mention of the
decision in Grand Bahama-previously the leading case in this area and
thoroughly publicized in legal writing. Although the court seemed willing
to apply a minimum contacts test in admiralty, its opinion, like so many
before it, discussed admiralty as an exceptional area of the law, stating
that "[a]s a participant in maritime commerce, Apex must expect to be
sued wherever its credits and property may be found." 5 4 If this language
is read literally, it contradicts the apparent holding that a minimum
contacts analysis should be applied, because it suggests that any forum
where credits are located would be fair to the defendant. Thus, despite
indicating that a minimum contacts analysis is appropriate, the First
Circuit gives credence to the primary argument of its predecessors,
founded on the presumption that, as Judge Tate states, "Admiralty is
Ancient and Admiralty is Different." 55 Although admiralty is indeed
ancient, and no one would contest its distinct legal sphere, it is questionable whether these are factors of constitutional magnitude.
One of the first elements used to distinguish admiralty is that the
authority of federal courts to hear these cases arises from an express
constitutional provision. 6 As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, "[tihe
framers considered admiralty jurisdiction so significant that they awarded
the Federal Courts the power to sit in Admiralty under a separate
constitutional delegation." 57 This argument is flawed in two respects.
First of all, it confuses subject matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction. The constitutional grant of power to federal courts to hear
cases in admiralty makes those courts competent to adjudicate maritime
disputes generally. In any particular case, however, the court must have
personal jurisdiction over the parties; in terms of International Shoe,
the parties must have sufficient contacts with the forum such that the
courts of that forum are competent to determine the rights of those
particular parties. In failing to recognize the distinction between subject
matter and personal jurisdiction, the courts have segregated admiralty
defendants as a class and held that as such they are to be afforded
some lesser degree of protection by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Such a generalized conclusion was at least implicitly rejected
by Shaffer. The plaintiff-appellees in Shaffer asserted that because the
defendants were officers and directors of a Delaware corporation, they
should be deemed to have minimum contacts with the state for jurisdictional purposes. Justice Marshall rejected this claim in Shaffer, stating
that such a "line of reasoning establishes only that it is appropriate for
Delaware law to govern the obligations of appellants to Greyhound and

54. 743 F.2d at 960.
55. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 663 F.2d at 1353 (Tate, J., dissenting).
56. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
57. Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th
Cir. 1984).
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its stockholders. It does not demonstrate that appellants have 'purposely
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state."'5 8 The proper analogy for admiralty is that while the
Constitution (in Article 1, section 2) does grant federal courts the authority to hear maritime cases, that provision only deals with the choice
of substantive law (which the federal sovereign alone can define) and
its application. Exercises of jurisdiction over the person must still focus
on the relationship of the defendant to the forum.
Secondly, to distinguish admiralty because the authority of the courts
arises by specific constitutional grant does not logically support its
distinction. Federal courts are, by nature, courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
Their authority extends only to those cases enumerated in Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution. The fact that cases in admiralty are
specifically named as justiciable in federal court should not automatically
distinguish them for constitutional purposes. The logic of the courts in
doing so would mean that due process means something different in
diversity cases, in federal question cases, and in every other category
enumerated by the Constitution. On the contrary, as Judge Tate noted
in-his dissent to Merchants Nat'l Bank, Shaffer can be read to stand
for the preference for uniform treatment of all cases under the Due
Process Clauses.6
The courts which have distinguished admiralty for purposes of a
Shaffer analysis have relied heavily on the long-standing use of maritime
seizures and their acceptance by the courts. In Shaffer, however, the
Court stressed the fact that due process is an organic concept in rejecting
similar arguments to altering basic principles of jurisdiction quasi in
rem: 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be
as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent
with the basic values of our constitutional heritage." ' 61 In this light, the
historical argument is questionable. Moreover, there has been a trend
in recent years to bring admiralty into line with other areas of the law,
as evidenced most notably in the 1966 "merger" of law and admiralty:
"Prior to 1966, the admiralty courts had been 'veiled in mystical words,
phrases, rules, and forms of practice which no outsider could confidently
an indepenetrate.' After 1966, the 'imaginary chair,' the 'fiction of
62
pendent admiralty jurisdiction' would, presumably, vanish."

58. Schaffer, 433 U.S. at 216, 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
59. See generally, C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 7 (4th ed. 1983).
60. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 663 F.2d at 1353 (Tate, J., dissenting).
61. 433 U.S. at 212, 97 S. Ct. at 2584.
62. Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification, 74
Mich. L. Rev. 1628, 1630-31 (1976)(quoting Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed from
the United States Courthouse; Or, What Have They Done to Admiralty?, 5 Williamette
L.J. 367, 374-75 (1969)).
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This merger of Law and Admiralty is similar to that of Law and
Equity in 1928, which has not given rise to any lasting constitutional
distinctions. No less should be true of a merger of Law and Admiralty.
Indeed, courts have not hesitated to modify traditional notions of admiralty's realm, such as permitting courts 'to exercise the remedies of
equity in admiralty proceedings, something very unusual prior to the
unification. Judge Brown, the author of Merchants Nat'l Bank, and
once called '"our leading admiralty authority". 63 by Justice Douglas, has
stated: "the Chancellor is no longer fixed to the woolsack. He may
stride the quarter-deck of maritime jurisprudence and, in the role of
admiralty judge, dispense, as would his landlocked brother, that which
equity and good conscience impels." 64 In light of the Supreme Court's
rejection of historical arguments in Shaffer and the narrowing gap
between Law and Admiralty, especially since the 1966 merger, the courts'
historical arguments for distinguishing cases in admiralty are unpersuasive.
Finally, the courts have attempted to distinguish admiralty proceedings from suits at law for practical reasons. As Judge Brown stated in
Merchants Nat'! Bank,
a paramount consideration is the highly mobile character of
contemporary maritime commerce. With vessels able to limit
their time in port to less than 24 hours, tremendous risks confront those who are involved in a collision with a vessel that
is still navigable, those who render goods and services to a
vessel, and those who extend credit to a vessel. 5
Yet as the court noted in Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V Acadian Valor 66 (which
was subsequently overruled by Merchants Nat'l Bank), in refusing to
distinguish admiralty proceedings in procedural due process cases,
property, simply because it is movable, possesses no inherent
characteristics which immunize it from due process. To hold otherwise would invite distinctions which the Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognize. Indeed, it is difficult to contemplate
property more mobile or more susceptible of concealment than
automobiles, motorboats, or refrigerators. Yet, it was in the context of [such] litigation that Fuentes was conceived."7
The Senner court's point is well taken: the "practical" considerations
alluded to by the courts of appeals are of no greater moment than similar
considerations in non-maritime cases. A defendant can flee a court's
63. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 115, 92 S. Ct. 349, 359 (1971)(Douglas,
J., dissenting), quoted in Robertson, supra note 62, at 1640, n.60.
64. Compania Anonima Venezolana de Nav. v. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692, 699
(5th Cir. 1962).
65. 663 F.2d at 1347.
66. 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980).
67. Id.at 294.
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jurisdiction by air or automobile, or can conceal consumer goods such
as those dealt with in Sniadach and Fuentes (when they are the subject
of repossession or similar proceedings), with at least as much ease and
freedom as a vessel can leave port. To whatever extent the restrictions
of due process impair the element of surprise for a plaintiff, it is obviously the decision of the Supreme Court that the resulting injustices
to the plaintiff are acceptable as part of the price of fundamental fairness
in the courts. An identical quid pro quo should apply in admiralty.
Moreover, in the situations contemplated by Judge Brown above, the
claims of the vessel's creditors would give rise to maritime liens on the
vessels, which would make a seizure action a true in rem proceeding under
Rule C; jurisdiction would be virtually assured.
An Alternative Analysis-Amoco Overseas Oil
In practice, the application of Shaffer due process standards to Rule
B seizures in admiralty need not significantly disrupt traditional procedures. First of all, as in non-admiralty matters, the cases in which a
minimum contacts analysis cannot be met are relatively rare, in light
of the cases determining what contacts are sufficient to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction. 68 Secondly, the fear that in admiralty matters no other
forum may be available to the plaintiff is adequately addressed by the
court in Shaffer, which left open the possibility of continued validity
for seizures under such circumstances. 69 Finally, without disregarding the
requirements of due process altogether, the fact that an action is brought
in admiralty may still warrant special consideration under a Shaffer
analysis. Because most parties to admiralty suits are merchants or commercial entities engaged in expensive operations of international scope,
it may be fair to summon such a defendant to a distant forum on
minimum contacts which might be insufficient in another context. This
is not to say, however, that defendants in admiralty should be categorically denied constitutional protections available to other parties. It
simply recognizes that under InternationalShoe and subsequent decisions,
a factual inquiry into the nature of the activities of a particular defendant
(maritime defendants being no different) may indicate that jurisdiction
in a particular forum was a forseeable and legally justified consequence
of the defendant's activities.
This logic was implicit in the appellate review of Amoco Overseas
Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne, 70 where a shipper of oil
seized funds deposited to the credit of a carrier who delivered an
insufficient quantity of oil. The Second Circuit, while not discussing

68. For a discussion of the liberal interpretation the courts have given the minimum
contacts test, see F. James & G. Hazzard, Civil Procedure § 12.14 (2d ed. 1977).
69. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211, n. 37, 97 S. Ct. at 2583, n. 37.
70. 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979).
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the point at great length, distinguished Shaffer on several factual-not
constitutional grounds:
First, and most notable, is the fact that here, unlike Shaffer,
the property attached is related to the matter in controversy...
Second, Shaffer involved an attempt by one domestic state to
assert jurisdiction over defendants who, it appears, could have
been sued in at least one other state in the United States. Here,
on the other hand, the jurisdictional issue is whether the appellant may be sued in the United States at all. . . Third,
Shaffer did not consider assertion of jurisdiction over property
in the admiralty context. Because the perpetrators of maritime
injury are likely to be peripatetic, and since the constitutional
power of the federal courts is separately derived in admiralty,
suits under admiralty jurisdiction involve separate policies to some
extent.7
Therefore, on the basis of these factual findings, the court concluded
that there was a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction under Shaffer.
Although the court embraced the fallacious rationale concerning admiralty's "separately derived" legal status, the court appears to have been referring only to the fact that maritime defendants are commonly "peripatetic"
and therefore more likely to be amenable to jurisdiction as individuals.
It did not adopt a broad exception for defendants in admiralty. Thus,
while Amoco Overseas Oil recognizes the distinct nature of admiralty,
the language emphasized above makes clear that that difference should
not make Shaffer inapplicable-it should only present another factual element to be weighed in determining whether an assertion of jurisdiction
is fair.
Conclusion
In Trans-Asiatic Oil, the First Circuit became the first court to
recognize the applicability of a minimum contacts standard to seizures
quasi in rem in admiralty since it was raised by the Second Circuit in
Amoco Overseas Oil. Trans-Asiatic Oil therefore stands as authority to
stem the tide of judicial thought which would refuse to extend constitutional protections on jurisdiction to maritime defendants. Whether it
will be followed, extended, or ignored remains to be seen, but thoughtful
analysis should confirm that further use of the minimum contacts doctrine in the realm of admiralty need be neither disruptive nor unfair to
most proceedings, while maintaining the integrity of due process.
Likewise, Amoco Overseas Oil sets forth a practical analysis which
illustrates to other courts the factual inquiries which are relevant to
determining whether an assertion of seizure-based jurisdiction in ad-

71.

Id. at 655 (citations omitted).
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miralty is fair. It is submitted that the inquiries illuminated by these
cases are preferable to the general distinction of admiralty which leaves
maritime defendants without constitutional protections. The Fifth Circuit
has not been faced with this issue, but since it narrowly limited its
decision in Merchants Nat'l Bank, and specifically did not speak to
situations under Rule B, it has left a niche for distinguishing quasi in
rem assertions of jurisdiction. While other courts have rejected due
process arguments more categorically, none, other than the First and
Second Circuits, have addressed this particular issue. Thus when other
courts are faced with such a case, while they may be forced to employ
logic which is somewhat inconsistent with procedural due process cases
like Merchants Nat'l Bank and Polar Shipping, they will not have to
reverse any cases outright, with the exception of any prior district court
opinions like Grand Bahama. In extending Shaffer, the courts will
promote both fairness in the admiralty courts and logic and uniformity
in due process cases.
George Arceneaux III

